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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We desire to supplement and to differ in some re-
spects with the statement of facts contained in Appel-
lants' brief. Our difference lays largely with respect to 
the mental condition of Emma G. Buttars. (References 
will be to the Clerk's numbering at the bottom of each 
page in blue numerals. ) 
( R. 56-57) Counsel for all parties stipulated that 
aside from the record in the former proceedings no fur-
ther proof would be offered as to the mental condition 
of Mrs. Buttars. "Both counsel for both sides recognize 
the fact that undue influence and fraud may indirectly 
involve mental competency, but in this respect both 
parties desire to refrain from direct testimony as to mental 
condition. IVIr. Daines: We so stipulate. Mr. Heinrich: 
We so stipulate." Thereupon the entire transcdpt in Case 
No. 5167 (the Will case) was offered and received. Upon 
the state of the record at that point in the case of In Re 
Buttars' Estate (Utah, Sept. 26, 1933), 261 P. 2d 171 
becomes factual because this Court said: 
"The evdence related above is proof that testatrix 
was essentric in her actions but is utterly insufficient 
to sustain the contestants' burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she lacked testa-
mentary capacity at the time she executed the Will" 
In relation to all of the conveyances both real and 
personal property the following facts are also recited: 
"Testatrix had always been a frugal woman who be-
lieved that one should earn what he received. 
Shortly after she executed her Will she made con-
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3 
veyances of a considerable part of her real property 
to Wallace and two of her younger daughters who 
lived near her. She also assigned some valuable 
bank stock and bought U. S. Savings Bonds for these 
daughters giving as her reason for doing so that they 
had received worthless stock from their father's es-
tate, of which she one of the administrators, as part 
of their share in his estate. This was not worthless 
at the time of the distribution but became so within 
a few years thereafter." 
All of the property involved in this Appeal is referred 
to in the quotation, and the references to individuals are 
to Archulius Archibald, Hattie Hodge and Wallace But-
tars. In view of the state of the record, it becomes un-
necessary to again incorporate the same facts in this state-
ment as Appellant has done. The Will was executed on 
March 22, 1945, so that at that time she has been judic-
ially declared to be mentally competent, and since the 
stipulation above referred to takes care of the question of 
mentality, the only remaining question is one of undue 
influence. The lower Court made a finding that there 
was a "close and intimate" relationship between Wallace, 
Archulius and their Mother. 
It was Mrs. Buttars, herself, who made arrangements 
about her bank account ( R.R. 93-94), and not because of 
any undue influence. ( R.H. 94) She made some of her 
transactions even without the knowledge of her son and 
daughter. who are charged with using undue influence. 
The facts concerning some of her bonds and 22 shares of 
bank stock were not known until after the death of Mrs. 
Buttars ( H.R. 95). There was no suggestion to Mrs. But-
tars by any one involved in this appeal as to what con-
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veyances should be made by her (R.R. 103-104), and the 
conveyances were all made in pursuance to a plan that 
Mrs. Buttars had in mind since shortly after her husband's 
estate had been probated (R.R. 105-106). The testimony 
of ~frs. Mabell Griffiths (beginning R.R. 108) makes no 
mention of fraud, undue influence or mental condition. 
Mrs. Jardine's testimony as to undue influence con-
tains only the following: ( R.R. 112). Supposedly the 
repetition of a statement made by Mrs. Buttars. "If they 
(the Archibalds) didn't have all the land they wanted 
why didn't they go to his own dad and get it, instead of 
hounding her for her's." Mrs. Buttars had reserved a life 
estate in real property to insure herself of a livelihood 
( R.R. 113). One of these deeds had been of record since 
the g}3th day of March, 1945, (only six days after Mrs. 
Buttars had executed her Will) and Mrs. Jardine (and un-
doubtedly other appellants) had known of the deeds and 
conveyances since 1950, and they waited until. after their 
Mother had died before bringing any action ( R.R. 114-
11.5-116). Nlrs. Buttars died on July 1st, 1952 ( R.R. 11.5 ). . 
.Melvin Buttars' testimony begins at page 118 of the 
Record. His testimony begins with a recitation of dispo-
sitions of property made by his Father. Wallace, Arch-
ulius and Hattie were all minors at their father's death 
( R.R. 122). Careful examination of this testimony fails 
to disclose any mention of a fact touching on the matter 
of undue influence or fraud. The only other witness was 
a Mr. Nielsen, who is a real estate salesman and testified 
only to land values. Respondents pleaded and relied on 
the statute of limitations, and moved to dismiss because 
of the running of the statute (R.R. 149 to 152). 
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The above is the state of the Record so far as Appel-
lants' testimony is concerned. 
E:rma Thompson, (not a member of the Buttars fam-
ily) visited Mrs. Buttars when the latter told her that she 
was. going to make the contemplated conveyances. This 
was ·in 1944 ( R.R. 154). 
; :'; Clara Stewart (not a member of the Buttars family) 
talked with Mrs. Buttars who told her that she had done 
well. fpr the other children and "would like to make it up 
for·:.the young~r children," meaning Wallace, Archulius 
and Hattie ( R. 160-161). That was in 1944. 
Tom Buttars ( R.R. 164) was a half brother of the father 
of all the parties to this litigation, and in talking with Mrs. 
Buhars mention was made that in the distribution of the 
father's estate the minors had not gotten their just rights 
and Mrs. Buttars then stated that she was· going to see to 
~t that such would be the case ( R.R. 164. to 166). That 
was between 1930 and 1940 and the reference was to 
Wallace, Archulius and Hattie (R.R. 170). 
David Sparks an impartial witness, stated ( R.R. 17 4 
to 176) that Nlrs. Buttars told him betweenl938 and 1940 
that: 
"She said she felt like the three younger children, 
Archulius, Wallace and Hattie, being the three 
youngest, you know, didn't get a square deal when 
their father's. estate was fixed up. And she said that 
she had made up her mind that when the estate was 
settled every one of the family got their share, and 
they would go their way and do just as they pleased 
with their portion of the property. And she felt 
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like she had the same right to do with her property, 
she was going to see that those younger children was 
taken care of to her knowledge." 
Wallace Buttars had never talked to his mother prior 
to .her deposit of the money in the First National Bank 
and he did not know of the deposit at the time ( R.R.l93). 
There were statements in the safety box at the First Secur-
ity Bank to the effect that certain transfers of stocks and 
bonds were made for the purpose of equalizing the fath-
er's estate. Wallace had nothing to do with such state-
ments ( R.R. 220) and he had nothing to do with the 
account at the First National Bank, and had nothing to 
do with transfering the money from First Security Bank to 
the First National Bank, except on April 1st, 1950, he 
signed the Joint Deposit ticket, (Ex. 16) with Emma G. 
Buttars there creating a joint and several account. (R 152) 
Upon that state of the record the lower Court held 
that there was no fraud and no undue influence practiced 
on Nirs. Emma G. Buttars. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The findings and judgment of the Court, 
finding and adjudging that Archulius Archibald and W al-
lace Buttars, are the owners of the real property, men-
tioned and described in their respective cases, No. 7605 
and No. 7607, are supported by competent and uncontra-
dicted evidence. 
The evidence is direct and positive that Emma G. 
Buttars conveyed to the defendant Wallace Buttars 120 
acres of dry farm land, as evidenced by two deeds of 
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conveyance, identified as Ex. 23 and Ex. 24; and, she 
conveyed to the defendant Archulius B. Archibald, 58.84 
acres of land, as evidenced by two deeds of conveyance, 
identified as Ex. 21 and Ex. 22. These deeds were ex-
ecuted by Mrs. Buttars on and between the 28th day of 
March, 1945, and the 6th day of May 1948, and they were 
filed for record with the County Recorder on the date 
they bear, except Ex. 22, which was filed five days after 
date thereof. 
Mrs. Buttars reserved a life estate in the property 
conveyed to Wallace and in the tract of 48.59 acres con-
veyed to Archulius.. Thus she continued to receive the 
income from the property to and including the year 1952, 
and her estate will receive the income to and including 
1954, as provided by the written leases. And this income 
is reflected in her bank accounts. ( R. 137). And more-
over, Mrs. Buttars retained title to additional real pro-
perty and also the bank accounts as appears from the 
petition to probate her will. ( R. 1-4). 
The manner in which Emma G. Buttars conducted 
her business affairs was without suggestion from any in-
dividual. She selected the time when each of the afore-
said deeds were executed. The defendant Wallace But-
tars testified from his business dealings and experience 
with her that - "I know definitely that no one could get 
Mother to do something she didn't want to do," and she 
kept her business matters to herself. ( R. 368, 369). 
With respect to the execution of said deeds, plain-
tiffs allege that the deeds were procured by unlawful 
means and undue influence and with intent to defraud 
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their brothers and sisters, and that Wallace and Archulius 
persuaded their mothers, Emma G. Buttars, to execute and 
deliver to them said deeds of conveyance. These allega-
tions were denied by the defendants, and it is submitted 
that plaintiffs evidence fails to prove these allegations. In 
addition to the constructive notice given to the plaintiffs, 
by the recording of said deeds, :Melvin, Maybell and Marg-
aret had actual notice thereof at the meeting held at 
Cornish Service Station in the fall of 1950. ( R.R. 94, 95, 
102). Why didn't they then talk to their Mother about 
the deeds and bank account, if they were in fact obtained 
by fradulent means? 
The fact that they did not then talk to her indicates 
that they then knew their Mother had purposely executed 
the deeds and opened the Savings account in the First 
National Bank, in order to equalize for the property given 
to the older children by their father. Although they did 
not talk to their mother as a committee, it does appear 
that 0:1aybell Griffith talked to her mother about the deeds 
made to Wallace and Archulius, and in response, Mrs. 
Buttars, according to the testimony of Archulius, "marked 
off portions on the table and she said - "your father gave 
the older boys their portions and I am going to give Wal-
lace his." (R.R. 96). 
The evidence discloses without dispute that Mrs. 
Buttars intended to give the three younger children, 
Archulius, Wallace and Hattie some property to equalize 
the property given by their father to the older children, 
particularly the older boys. ( R.R. 17 4). Testimony to 
the same effect was given by the witness, David Sparks, 
who testified that- "And she said that she had made up 
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her mind that • when· the estate was settled every one of 
the family got their.share, and· they would go their way 
and'do just as they pleased with their portion of the pro-
perty. And she felt like she had the same right to do with 
her property, she ·was going to see that those younger 
children was· taken care of to her knowledge" ( R.R, 17 4). 
That conversation was had about the year 1945. ( R.R. 17 4) 
It will thus be seen that Mrs. Buttars had been in-
tending for a periOd of time to give the younger children 
c~rtain property to equalize for the property received by 
th~ older boys· when they were married. And moreover, 
for. many years Archulius and Wallace lived near their 
mother and saw her daily and when ever she needed a 
service of ~ny kind ou'e or the other responded. This is 
reflected throughout. their testimony. 
It should also be kept in mind that this is not a case 
.where the grantor conveyed all of his or her property, to 
avoid heirs at law, or creditors. In the case at bar, Mrs. 
Buttars. retained about 170 acres of farm land, and per-
sonal property, free of encumbrance, in which the plain-
tiffs herein will equally participate. In most, if not all 
of the cases cited in appellants brief, the grantor's con-
veyance included all of his or her property. 
'· Plaintiffs and appellants contend that Mrs. Buttars 
~as· i~competent at th~ time each of the deeds were ex-
ecuted. The defendants witnesses testified that Md. 
Buttars was fllcompetent at the ti~e each of the deeds 
wer~ execute·cl""' 1 '* ~ 8th iky f mg, !E.fB. 
In support- :of their .'COntention they cite, Kadogan v. 
Booker~ 66 S. E. 297. From an examination of the 
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opinion in that case it will ·be seen that the mental 
and physical condition of Laura Swain, the grantor,· at 
the time she executed the deed was vastly different from 
the mental and physical condition of Mrs. Buttars, when 
each of the deeds in question were executed by her. And 
the circumstances under which the deed was executed 
in that case were entirely different from the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the execution of deeds in the 
case at bar. Despite that fact the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia stated the rule to be - "There exists a presump-
tion that a grantor in a deed conveying real estate was 
mentally competent to execute the deed. Mere infirmity 
of mind and body is not sufficient to over come such pre-
sumption. The time of the execution and delivery of the 
instrument is the time at which the question of mental 
capacity is to be determined." 
Appellants cite Johnson vs. Reese, 249 S. W. 538, 
(Ky.) as authority. Here again the facts and circum-
stances are at variance with the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the deeds by Mrs. Buttars. 
In the course of the opinion the court stated: ''There was 
evidence that grantor was easily influenced," and that, 
"The daughter and her husband, living with the grantor, 
had the opportunity to and undoubtedly did influence 
him. The record shows that the grantor was in bad health 
and had to be taken care of before and at the !time of the 
execution of the deed." 
The case of :Morris vs. Williams-Gfuriso~, 128 S. E. 
78, 99 W. Va. 140, is also cited by appellants. In review-
ing the facts the court stated: "The grantor in that case 
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was a moron. From his childhood his mentality had been 
regarded subnormal by his family, and the people of the 
community. His mind had never grown up. His parents 
considered him mentally incapable of. attending to any 
business, and managed all his affairs during their life-
. time." 
, .We have examined all the cases cited by appellants 
in their brief and in every instance -the condition of the 
grantor was in a much more serious condition than was 
Emma C. Buttars when she executed each of the deeds 
involved in the case at bar. In fact her h~alth was normal 
for a woman of her age. This is the testimony of some 
15 witnes_ses including neighbors, business people and her 
physician, all of whom testified positively that until March 
21, 1951, when she suffered a heart attack, she was healthy 
and normal in all respects. She took care of her own busi-
ness, wrote and signed checks on her bank account. Made 
deposits to her checking and savings accounts, and it was 
during this time that she purchased the bonds and securi-
ties found in her bank box after her demise. n As reflected 
by the evidence in this case Mrs .. Buttars' business ability 
and acumen was far above average. 
Point 2. Appellants contend that there existed a 
confidential relationship between Emma G. Buttars and 
her children, Archulius and Wallace, at the time the 
transfers or attempted transfers were made. 
Appelants base their conclusions upon the fact that 
Archulius and Wallace lived near their mother and visited 
frequently. Appellants counsel cite the case of Fisher vs. 
Burgiel, (Ill.) 46 N. E. 380, contending that the facts in 
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that case are similar to the facts in the instant case. When 
the opinion in that case is examined it will be seen that 
the mental and physical condition of Nellie Hollingshead 
were such that she was suffering from senile dementia; 
that she did not understand or comprehend the nature of 
her acts. She was forgetful and absent minded, was dirty 
and unkempt in her house and personal habits; that she 
failed to recognize old friends. Her physjcian testified 
that from 1936, she had a progressive senile dementia. 
It was while in this condition that she signed the deeds 
and made withdrawals from the Bank. The foregoing 
facts appears from the opinion. There was some testi-
mony to the contrary. There was no reservation of a life 
estate, and it does not appear whether she possessed or 
owned other property, but it is evident from the condition 
of her health that she was unable to and did not transact 
business as was done by Mrs. Buttars, for more than three 
years after the last deed was executed. 
The case of Woolwine vs. Bryant, (Iowa) 54 N. W. 
759, is cited but the facts in that case are dissimilar from 
the facts in case at bar. No relationship existed between 
the grantor and grantee, and a life estate in the property 
was not reserved in the deed. On conflicting evidence 
the court cancelled the deed and upon appeal judgment 
was affirmed. In the case at bar there was substantial 
evidence to support the judgment of the trial court, and 
although the plaintiffs attempted to show that there ex-
isted a confidential relationship between Mrs. Buttars and 
Wallace and Archulius, there was an abundance of testi-
mony to the contrary, and the court had a right to resolve 
the conflict, if any, in favor of respondents. 
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By use of the Corpus Juris digest we were referred 
to a very late Oklahoma case, Watkins vs. Musselman et. 
al. 239 P. 2nd 418, where the facts are very similar to the 
facts in the instant case, and it was contended that fraud 
and undue influence had been exercised upon the grantor. 
The· trial court there held that the deeds were executed 
and delivered as the free and voluntary act of the grantor, 
and that the transaction was free of any undue influence 
or fraud: In- the course of the opinion the court held that 
_:_"the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on 
appeal, unless the same is clearly against the weight of the 
evidence.'? In holding against the contention of the plain-
tiff and appellant in that case, that undue influence had 
been execised upon . the grantor when she executed the 
deed the court stated: "As we view the plaintiffs' evidence 
it, at most, discloses that Patti Musselman had an oppor-
tunity to unduly influence Mrs. Brown, not that she in 
fact did.'' In the course of the opinion the following rule 
is stated: "Power, motive and opportunity to exercise un-
due influence do not alone authorize the inference that 
such influence has in fact been exercised," and, in refer-
ring to the court's holding in a previous case, Melton vs. 
Melton, 135 P. 2d. 43, the opinion states: "we held: 'To 
set aside any transaction on the ground of undue influence, 
it must be shown not only that such influence existed and 
that it was exercised, but also that it was exercised ef-
fectively; that is, that it was the efficient cause in bringing 
about the transaction complained of.'' 
We also found a late case from the state of Colorado. 
Mehlbrant vs. Hal, 213 P. 2d. 605. The facts in that case 
reveal that in accordance with a previous wish the mother 
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executed a deed conveying certain real estate to her son. 
It appears that this was the only property she owned. 
Her daughter with whom she had lived shortly prior to 
the execution of this deed, and apparently the only other 
child took action as the administratix of her estate to set 
aside the deed. The trial court held against the plaintiff 
and on appeal the judgment was affirmed. 
Upon appeal the appellant contended that there was 
a fiduciary relationship between mother and son and that 
the son had exercised undue influence upon his mother 
in procuring the deed. The trial court in finding against 
the plaintiff stated: "The burden of proof is on the plain-
tiff, and after most mature consideration of all the facts, 
I must conclude that the plaintiff has not sustained the 
burden, and the issues in this case will be resolved in favor 
of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and the plain-
tiffs complaint will be dismissed." 
In the course of the opinion the court followed a rule 
adopted by the court in an earlier case: "In equity the 
judgment is essentially a deduction as to what is just and 
true from the facts and circumstances proven in each par-
ticular case. It is therefore a question for the trial court 
as to the convincing effect of the evidence, when that 
tribunal enters a decree, and there is a quantum of admis-
sible and proper evidence to support its conclusions, we 
must presume that it was governed by proper rules of 
law, unless the contrary appears, and that its findings are 
correct." 
There are numerous decisions holding to the same 
effect. When that rule is applied to the undisputed facts 
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in the case at bar, it is respectfully submitted that the 
judgments of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Point 3. The findings and fudgment of the court 
declaring Wallace Buttars and Arc hilus B. Archibald to 
be owners of the United States savings bond, mentioned 
and described in their respective cases, are supported 
by competent and uncontradicted evidence. 
The United States Savings Bonds involved in this 
matter were held in joint tenants and the parties so stipu-
lated ( R.R. 149). The Court asked the question ( R.R. 
149): "Q. Do I understand that either of these owners 
could present that bond for payment, and be paid in cash 
without the other persons consent or authorization in any 
way? A. That is right." (R.R. 149). This, of course, 
should dispose of the question of ownership of the bonds. 
Davies v. Beach et al (Cal.) 168 2d 452. (Note: 
This case involved U. S. Bonds with the standard 
"payable at death" clause, but the Court did not 
consider the difference between such a clause and 
joint tenancy important) "the regulations of the 
Treasury Department, under which the bonds are 
issued, have the force of Federal Laws; the State 
cannot vary the terms of federal obligations . . . . . 
Some of the bonds in those· cases were issued to two 
persons as co-owners, and others to the purchaser, 
and upon his death, to a named beneficiary. There 
seems to be no logical distinction to be made between 
the rights in the bonds of a surviving beneficiary." 
We believe that a recent Montana case sufficiently 
disposes of this particular question. In Re Marsh's Estate 
(Mont.) 234 P. 2d 459. In that case the bonds were made 
in the name of "C. H. Marsh," and others. 
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"However, government bonds (same type as involved 
in our case) because of the special nature of the 
contract can never be held in tenancy by the en-
tirety. The characteristic that disinguishes the ten-
ancy by the entirety from other co-tenancies is that 
neither of the cotenants alone can terminate the 
tenancy or sever the estate. Either cotenant may 
sell government bonds upon sun-ender of the bond 
and receive the full accrued value. The tenancy is 
thus severed and one cotenant can reduce the entire 
property to his own possession and his cotenant re-
ceives nothing." (Italics supplied.) 
The law relating to gifts inter vivos has no applica-
tion to U.S. Treasury Bonds, and this has been held count-
less times. For an example see Lee v. Anderson (Ariz.) 
218 P. 2d 732. Further citations would unduly lengthen 
this brief to no avail. 
Point 4. The findings and fudgment of the court, 
finding and ad fudging that Wallace Buttars is the owner 
of the savings account in the First National Bank, are sup-
ported by competent and uncontradicted evidence. 
From the evidence it appears that Emma G. Buttars, 
on January 29, 1947, deposited $5,000.00, with the First 
National Bank of Logan, in a joint savings account in the 
names of Emma G. Buttars, Oid! Wallace Buttars. ( R.R. 
147). The deposit ticket was identified as Con. No. 11, 
Case No. 5167, and was offered and received in evidence. 
With permission of the court a copy of this exhibit was 
substituted for the original. ( R.R. 149). On that date 
the account was posted to the Savings account ledger 
sheet. ( R.R. 147). And a joint deposit card (Con. Ex. 
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No. 13) was prepared with the names of Emma G. Buttars 
and Walace Buttars, typed thereon under date of Jan. 29, 
1947. This card contained the signatures of Emma G. 
Buttars and Walace Buttars on the front side thereof, but 
apparently through oversight they did not sign their 
names to the reverse side thereof. ( R.R. 152). This card 
was identified as exhibit No. 13. 
The account remained in this condition until April 24, 
1950, when a new card (Ex. No. 16) was prepared by the 
bank and presented to Emma G. Buttars, when she and 
Walace signed it on both sides and in accordance there-
with a joint account was legaly established. This card 
remained in possession of the bank until it was offered in 
evidence in the trial of the case No. 5167, and with per-
mission of the court it was released to the bank and a copy 
thereof was substituted. ( R.R. 153). 
On J an~ary 6~ 1948, Mr. Hanson, wrote a letter to 
Mrs. Buttars, to inquire whether she intended that the 
account should be a joint account with her son Wallace. 
"We are now concerned about what your wishes actually 
were. Is this account supposed to be a joint account with 
yourself. and your son, and if so does your name and his 
name appear on your savings pass book." (Con. Ex. No. 
19, Case No. 5167). 
Mrs. Buttars replied to the aforesaid letter on Jan. 
10, 1948, in which letter she stated: "In reply to your 
letter of Jan. 6, 1948. I wish to inform you that this ac-
count you mention should be a joint account with me and 
my son Wallace, and that his name does appear on the 
savings pass book. · Thank you, very truly, EMMA G. 
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BUTTARS." The letter was likely written by the bank, 
because some of the plaintiffs called there to investigate 
the account. ( R.R. 155) and Mr. Hanson wanted definite 
information directly from Mrs. Buttars, relative to the 
nature of the account. And from the language of her 
reply he received direct information from her that it was 
a joint account. 
Subsequently thereto the bank discovered that the 
joint deposit card, Exhibit 13, did not contain the signa-
hires of Emma G. Buttars and Wallace Buttars on the 
reverse side thereof below the JOINT DEPOSITORS 
AGREEMENT. Accordingly the bank prepared what is 
identified as Con. No. 16, Date April 24, 1950, and pre-
sented it to Mrs. Buttars and she and Wallace signed it 
on both sides and it is retained by the bank to evidence 
the joint ownership of the savings account. 
The appellants have not cited any legal authority 
with respect to the bank account. They merely contend 
that she was unduly influenced by Wallace. The undis-
puted evidence shows that he was not aware of the sav-
ings account until after it had been made. ( R. 194). The 
appellants admit in their brief, page 46, that :Maybell 
learned of the savings account after it was made. And 
Russell Hanson testified that plaintiff Melvin Buttars and 
his brother Orson came to the bank in the year 1950, to 
investigate the Savings account, rand that some of the girls 
came to the bank to talk to Mr. Hanson about the account. 
(R. 155). If in fact Wallace had unduly influenced his 
mother in giving him savings account, which is not ad-
mitted, why did not the boys and girls above referred to 
inform :\1rs. Buttars that she had been defrauded? She 
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was alive and could have taken legal action against Wal-
lace, if in fact he had taken undue advantage of her. And 
if she had been as weak minded as there testimony implies, 
a guardian could have been appointed to bring proper 
legal action against Wallace. But on the contrary not a 
thing is done until after her demise. 
Mr. John Olson, assistant cashier of the First National 
Bank testified that Contestant's exhibit No. 16, created a 
joint account between Emma G. Buttars and Wallace 
Buttars, and that upon the death of either party, the sur-
vivor became the owner of the account. ( R.R. 182). 
The appellants contended that because the passbook 
. to the ac~ount coud not be found, it affected the legality 
of the joint account. However, Ariel Berntson, assistant 
cashier of the Bank testified that the ownership of the 
savings account in question was evidenced by the joint 
depositors's agreement on the reverse side of exhibit No. 
16, dated April 24, 1950, and not upon the passbook. 
( R.R. 226). He also testified that if the passbook is lost, 
"we have them sign an indemnity bond protecting the 
bank.'' The ownership of the account is not affected by 
loss of the pass book. ( R.R.227). 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of this 
Court in the case of Holt vs. Bayles, 39 P. 2d 716, is con-
trolling and determinative in the case at bar. By com-
parison it will be seen that the deposit card signed by 
Anna M. Bayles and Emma Bayles, when the savings 
account was made is identical in substance with the card 
signed by Mrs. Buttars and Wallace, dated April24, 1950. 
(Ex. No. 16). In the course of the opinion it is stated: 
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"The trial court in its decision was controlled largely by 
the agreement of joint tenancy executed by Anna and 
Emma Bayles. The effect to be given the writing is in-
deed the crux of the case." 
This court also distinguishes three former decisions: 
"The cases of Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, Olson 
v. Scott, and Boyle v. Dinsdale, supra, turned on the 
question of whether or not there was a gift inter 
vivos, not whether there had been the creation of 
a joint ownership with right of Survivorship." 
In view of the express provisions contained in the 
depositors signature card in that case, as is true in the 
case at bar, it was held that the account shall be owned 
by them jointly with right of survivorship. 
For the foreging reason defendants and respondents 
respectfully submits that the judgment of the trial court in 
both cases should be affirmed with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. NELSON 
GEORGE D. PRESTON, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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